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In recent years a growing number of cases known as the radicalisation cases began to 
appear in the family courts, dealing with concerns related to extremism, radicalisation 
and terrorism and their impact on children and families. In this article I argue that the 
radicalisation cases represent an important legal development since the direct 
involvement of the family courts in preventing and countering (the involvement of children 
in) terrorism is unprecedented in the UK. This article subjects the radicalisation cases and 
the novel interaction between family law and counter-terrorism that they have 
engendered to careful analysis and critical examination. By factually and legally 
contextualising the radicalisation cases, the article examines how this interaction has 
taken place. The article goes on to critically interrogate why the radicalisation cases have 
appeared in the family courts at this point in time, arguing that the cases are influenced by 
and in fact reinforce a changing political context and a shifting counter-terrorism and 
security landscape that is anxious about and that seeks to regulate Muslim cultural 
difference, Muslim cultural life and political or ideological expressions of Islam. Finally, the 
article examines some of the worrying implications of this interaction between family law 
and counter-terrorism. 
 
Introduction 
On 26 February 2018, Mark Rowley, the outgoing Assistant Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police, called for the children of ‘those convicted of terrorist offences 
including radicalisers’ to be removed from the care of their parents.1 Although Rowley 
acknowledged that the family courts and social services have been dealing with 
safeguarding and child protection concerns arising within the context of terrorism, 
extremism and radicalisation in recent years, he argued that more could be done to 
protect children from parents ‘who teach their children to hate’.2 Rowley’s controversial 
comments are the latest in a series of high-profile interjections on the topic of childhood 
radicalisation and the role that child protection agencies and the family courts can play 
to prevent it.3 At the heart of this discussion are the radicalisation cases in the family 
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1 F Hamilton, ‘Extremists should lose access to their children, says Scotland Yard chief’ The Times (27 February 2018). 
2 Ibid. 
3 B Johnson, ‘The children taught at home about murder and bombings’ The Telegraph (2 March 2014). 
courts which were first reported in the media in August 20154 and which continued to 
appear in the family courts of England and Wales at a steady pace.5 To deal with this 
new influx of radicalisation cases formal guidance was issued by Sir James Munby (then 
President of the Family Division of the High Court) in October 2015, setting out the 
processes and procedures to be complied with by those engaged with radicalisation 
cases.6 
According to the guidance, radicalisation cases are those that involve three main types 
of allegations or suspicions: ‘that children, with their parents or on their own, are 
planning or attempting or being groomed with a view to travel to parts of Syria 
controlled by the so-called Islamic State; that children have been or are at risk of being 
radicalised; or that children have been or at are at risk of being involved in terrorist 
activities either in this country or abroad’.7 The radicalisation cases are, in short, 
concerned with preventing and countering (the involvement of children in) terrorism, 
extremism and radicalisation. 
The radicalisation cases are an important legal development. Although evidence 
suggests that local authorities may have temporarily cared for children whose parents 
were detained or arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts during the Northern 
Irish Troubles,8 it is important to note that neither the family courts nor the child 
protection agencies were ever directly involved in counter-terrorism in the UK. 
Therefore, the radicalisation cases represent a novel interaction between otherwise 
very separate areas of state activity, family law and counter-terrorism, creating hitherto 
non-existent ‘family law versions of counter-terrorism’.9 
In this article, I seek to subject the radicalisation cases and the interaction between 
family and counter-terrorism that they have engendered to careful analysis and critical 
examination. In Part I of the article, I examine how this interaction has taken place by 
factually contextualising the radicalisation cases and situating them within their wider 
statutory and legal context. In Part II, I critically interrogate why the radicalisation cases 
have appeared in the family courts, taking issue with claims that the radicalisation cases 
are simply about protecting vulnerable children from obvious or straightforward child 
protection issues and promoting their welfare. To that end I argue, firstly, that the 
radicalisation cases are both influenced by and must be understood as being part of a 
specific social and political context that is apprehensive about and seeks to regulate 
Muslim cultural difference and Muslim family life. Secondly, I argue that the 
radicalisation cases and their emergence in the family courts have been enabled by a 
shifting counter-terrorism and security landscape and a new understanding and 
construction of the terrorist threat. Finally, in Part III I look at some of the worrying 
implications that arise from this interaction.  
                                                 
4 ‘Judges considering fate of children as young as two amid radicalisation fears’ The Guardian (5 August 2015). 
5 N Hall, ‘Cafcass responds to a DfE report on safeguarding and radicalisation’ (Cafcass Blog, 4 September 2017). 
6 Radicalisation Cases in the Family Courts: Guidance issued by Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, on 
8 October 2015.  
7 Ibid, para 1. 
8 P Hillyard, Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain (Pluto Press, 1993), 
49–51.  
9 C Walker, Foreign Terrorist Fighters and UK Counterterrorism Law in D Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2015: Report 
of the Independent Reviewer in the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (December 
2015), 128.  
Although the article mainly involves a textual analysis of the radicalisation cases, 
empirical research methods were also used including Freedom of Information (FOI) 
requests and interviews with solicitors and barristers and Children and Family Court 
Advisory and Support Service (Cafcass) employees who have worked on the 
radicalisation cases. 10  
Part I: The factual and legal landscape  
1. Facts and figures 
The exact number of the radicalisation cases is unknown. Although there are currently 
38 published family cases that deal with radicalisation, it is important to be aware that 
the published cases represent only ‘a fraction of those decided’.11 The evidence suggests 
that there are many12 more unpublished radicalisation cases.13  
At this point it is important to factually contextualise the radicalisation cases by saying a 
few words about the sociological make-up of the children and families involved. First, 
although the children and families involved come from a mix of ethnic backgrounds, 
they are all Muslim, since the family courts have been almost exclusively concerned 
with Islamist radicalisation.14 Secondly, the Muslim families in the radicalisation cases 
come from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds, involving relatively stable and 
loving15 families where the only welfare concern is that of radicalisation.16 This mix of 
socio-economic backgrounds and the relative stability of the families involved, sets the 
radicalisation cases apart from the usual type of care cases involving neglect, domestic 
violence, substance abuse and a general history of family chaos and instability.17 
Thirdly, although the radicalisation cases feature both girls and boys, gender emerges as 
an important category since in the eyes of the judges the risks involved ‘differ according 
                                                 
10 Overall, seven interviews were conducted. My sincerest thanks to the interviewees for their sharing their experiences and 
thoughts. 
11 M Wheeler, ‘Radicalism in the Family Courts’ UK Human Rights Blog, 30 October 2015. 
12 In June 2016 Cafcass published a report which showed that between July 2015 and December 2015 there were 54 family 
cases where radicalisation featured as a concern (Cafcass, Study of data held by Cafcass in cases featuring radicalisation 
(Cafcass, 2016), 7). I sent three FOI requests to Cafcass asking for regular updates on the number of family cases involving 
radicalisation concerns. Cafcass’ responses show that between January 2016 and March 2018, 231 cases have appeared in 
the family courts featuring radicalisation concerns.  
13 It is not clear why there are so many unpublished radicalisation cases, although the interviewees suggested a number of 
reasons including the fact that some of the radicalisation cases would have been decided before concurrent criminal 
proceedings have been brought to an end, or because the information is too sensitive for national security or child protection 
reasons. 
14 Although far-right extremism and radicalisation concerns have been raised (and dismissed) in two published family law 
cases, Re A (Application for Care and Placement Orders: Local Authority Failings) [2015] EWFC 11, [2016] 1 FLR 1 and 
Re V (Children) [2015] EWHC B28 (Fam), (unreported) 15 December 2015, these have not been categorised as 
radicalisation cases. 
15 Although ‘stable’ is, of course a contentious and subjective term, it was used by the solicitors, barristers and Cafcass 
officers during the interviews to highlight the fact that, generally speaking, the children in the radicalisation cases are well-
cared for and are not neglected or (otherwise) abused.  
16 See London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B [2015] EWHC 2491 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 877, para [5]; Re X (Children) 
(No 3) [2015] EWHC 3651 (Fam), [2017] 1 FLR 172, para [84]; Re C, D, E (Children) (Radicalisation: Fact Finding) 
[2016] EWHC 3087 (Fam), (unreported) 29 January 2016, para [6] and A Local Authority v HB and Others [2017] EWHC 
1437 (Fam), [2018] 1 FLR 625, para [84]. 
17 A Bainham, ‘Private and public children law: an under-explored relationship’ [2013] CFLQ 138. A list of the usual factors 
that are found in care proceedings were enumerated in Re BR (Proof of Facts) [2015] EWFC 41, (unreported) 11 May 2015. 
to gender’.18 For whilst it is feared that boys travelling to join terrorist groups in Syria 
might be seriously injured or even die during combat and become ‘martyrs’,19 the fear is 
that girls will become ‘Jihadi Brides’20 and face ‘sexual … exploitation’.21 Fourthly, 
although the radicalisation cases are concerned with children from a wide age range, it 
is worth noting that ‘young people in the age bracket of 14–18 years’ have been 
considered to be ‘particularly vulnerable’22 and deserving of attention and protection.  
2. The legal framework 
The radicalisation cases have all been brought to the family courts under the Children 
Act (CA) 1989. It is true that the emergence of the radicalisation cases in the family 
courts coincided23 with the passing of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) 
2015 and the introduction of the ‘Prevent duty’ which placed the Prevent strategy, the 
preventative strand of the government’s official counter-terrorism policy CONTEST, on a 
statutory footing.24 But whilst the ‘Prevent duty’ made it a legal obligation for a number 
of public bodies (including local authorities and schools) to have ‘due regard’ to the 
need to prevent terrorism,25 no specific measures were introduced to enable the family 
courts to deal with children at risk of travelling to Syria, involvement in terrorism 
and/or radicalisation.26 The radicalisation cases can, therefore, be divided into three 
categories based on the type of family law proceedings involved. 
Private law radicalisation cases 
Radicalisation concerns have been raised in private law proceedings between disputing 
parents. In fact, the first published family case where radicalisation issues were raised 
as a concern was a private law case.27 In private law radicalisation cases, usually 
regarding the issue of contact, a parent,usually the mother, accuses the other parentof 
holding extremist beliefs that can radicalise and therefore harm the child(ren) in 
question. For example, in Re M (Children),28 the mother alleged, during the course of a 
dispute between the parents with regards to the level of contact to be afforded to the 
father, that the father had ‘forced his son to watch Jihadist DVDs in order to radicalise 
                                                 
18 London Borough of Tower Hamlets v M and Others [2015] EWHC 869 (Fam), [2015] 2 FLR 1431, para [4]. 
19 M Downs and S Edwards, Brides and martyrs: protecting children from violent extremism (Family Law, 2015).  
20 London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B [2016] EWHC 1707 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 887, para [86].  
21 Ibid, para [20].  
22 A Local Authority v Y [2017] EWHC 968 (Fam), [2018] 1 WLR 66, para [1]. 
23 M Downs, ‘Police Anti-terrorism “Lead” calls for children to be protected from terrorist parents on a par with paedophilia’ 
(UK Human Rights Blog, 1 March 2018). 
24 Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. 
25 Ibid. 
26 This distinguishes the legal response to the risk of travel to Syria and/or childhood radicalisation from the legal response 
to other, comparable, child protection concerns such as Female Genital Mutilation and forced marriage, where specific 
legislative measures were introduced empowering the family courts to make specific protection orders. It is important to 
note, however, that the government has recently announced its intention to amend its counter-terrorism legislation to make 
the encouragement of terrorism or the dissemination of terrorist publications in cases involving children a specific terrorist 
offence, suggesting that childhood radicalisation will be specifically criminalised. See Home Office, Counter-Terrorism and 
Border Security Bill 2018: Overarching Fact Sheet (6 June 2018), 1. 
27 Re M (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 388. 
28 Ibid. 
him’.29 Similarly in Re A and B (Children: Restrictions on Parental Responsibility: 
Radicalisation and Extremism),30 the mother made an application for a number of 
section 8 orders, including a contact order, accusing the father of being a radicalised 
individual who supported the cause of Islamist terrorist groups such as ISIS.31  
However, although ‘allegations of radicalising by one parent against the other’ have 
been increasingly ‘forming part of the separation weaponry’32 used by disputing parents 
against each other in private law proceedings, they have in fact proved very difficult to 
substantiate and have mostly been unsuccessful, failing to reach the requisite 
evidentiary threshold.33 Yet this does not seem to have deterred disputing parents from 
making accusations of radicalisation against each other in private family law 
proceedings.34 This suggests that parents and their counsel think that making an 
accusation of radicalisation is a strategic way of giving an otherwise unremarkable 
private family law case a higher profile and sense of urgency.35 It seems that 
radicalisation is now becoming a contemporary social (if not legal) category of what 
Helen Reece calls parental ‘deviance’.36  
Wardship radicalisation cases 
One of the noticeable aspects of the radicalisation cases has been the frequent use of 
wardship proceedings.37 Because the status of ward of court is internationally 
recognised,38 wardship is used in cases with an international dimension such as 
international abduction,39 Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage.40 
Therefore, wardship has been viewed as being particularly ‘apposite’41 in radicalisation 
cases involving attempted or likely travel to ISIS-held territory in Syria. Moreover, since 
care and/or supervision orders for children who are 16 years or older are regarded as 
having only a limited effect in terms of protecting and safeguarding children who are 
over the age of 16,42 the majority of radicalisation cases featuring wardship proceedings 
involve older children.43  
                                                 
29 Ibid, para [17]. 
30 [2016] EWFC 40, [2016] 2 FLR 977. 
31 Ibid. 
32 A Douglas, ‘The Needs of Children in Cases Featuring Radicalisation’ (Cafcass Blog, 22 November 2016). 
33 Re M (n 27 above) and Re A and B (n 30 above). The interviewees confirmed that not a single one has reached the 
evidentiary threshold.  
34 Around a third of the radicalisation cases are private law radicalisation cases: see Hall (n 5). 
35 There is perhaps a parallel here between accusations of radicalisation and accusations of child sexual abuse in private law 
disputes. The latter has given rise to extensive academic concern and focus. See: EP Benedek and DH Schetky, ‘Allegations 
of sexual abuse in child custody and visitation disputes’ in EP Benedek and DH Schetky (eds), Emerging Issues in Child 
Psychiatry and the Law (Brunner/Mazel, 1985).  
36 H Reece, ‘Was there, is there and should there be a presumption against deviant parents?’ [2017] CFLQ 9, 10–14.  
37 S Edwards, Protecting schoolgirls from terrorism grooming [2015] 3 IFL 236, 237–240.  
38 London Borough of Tower Hamlets v M and Others (n 18 above), para [9]. 
39 Re Y (Risk of Young Person Travelling to Join IS) (No 2) [2015] EWHC 2099 (Fam), [2016] 2 FLR 229, para [15]. 
40 Re M (Wardship: Jurisdiction and Powers) [2015] EWHC 1433 (Fam), [2016] 1 FLR 1055. 
41 Ibid, para [9]. 
42 S Williams, ‘Radicalisation: a proportionate response’ (28 October 2015) Family Law Week. 
43 With the exception of Re M (n 40 above). 
Public law radicalisation cases 
The majority of the radicalisation cases involve public family law proceedings. As will be 
discussed in more detail below, radicalisation and extremism have been identified by 
the government, in both counter-terrorism policy and legislation44 and child welfare 
policy,45 as safeguarding and child protection concerns that can engage the safeguarding 
and child protection duties of local authorities.46 Although local authorities have 
reached diverse conclusions regarding the most appropriate safeguarding and child 
protection response to radicalisation,47 children at risk of radicalisation have been 
recognised by the courts as ‘children in need’48 and as such eligible for a range of 
voluntary and support services under section 17 of the CA 1989.  
However, most of the public law radicalisation cases reach the family courts because the 
local authority in question seeks to protect the child or children by intervening in a 
compulsory manner and applying for care and/ or supervision orders. To date, there has 
only been one public law radicalisation case involving a parent who has actually 
travelled with their child(ren) to Syria.49 In the majority of the public law radicalisation 
cases, local authorities apply for supervision and/or care orders because they either 
suspect that the parents and/or children have attempted (or are planning) to travel to 
join terrorist groups in Syria50 or because they suspect that the parents and/or children 
hold extremist views that can radicalise the children51 or (as is often the case) both. 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 For example, HM Government, The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England. Stopping people becoming 
or supporting terrorists and violent extremists (2008), 47 and HM Government, ‘Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for 
England and Wales’ (July 2015), paras 34–40. 
45 For example, Department for Children, Schools and Families, Working Together to Safeguard Children (DCSF, 2010), 
chapter 11 and HM Government, Working Together to Safeguard Children (2015), chapter 1. 
46 T Stanley and S Guru, ‘Childhood Radicalisation Risk: An Emerging Practice Issue’ (2015) 27 Social Work in Action 353. 
47 T Chisholm and A Coulter, Safeguarding and radicalisation: Research Report (DfE, August 2017), 4. 
48 A v London Borough of Enfield [2016] EWHC 567 (Admin), [2017] 1 FLR 203, paras [35]–[37]. 
49 Re Y (A Child) (Care Proceedings) [2016] EWFC 30, [2016] 2 FLR 1074. Although with the return of women and 
children travelling from ISIS-held territory in Syria, it is likely that the issue of returning families and children will dominate 
the work of the family courts. See C Barnes, Radicalisation Cases in the Family Courts: Part 4: Three-year Review [2018] 
Fam Law 197, 200.  
50 Leicester City Council v T [2016] EWFC 20, [2017] 1 FLR 1585; A Local Authority v M [2016] EWHC 1599 (Fam), 
[2017] 1 FLR 1389; Re X (Children) and Y (Children) (No 1) [2015] EWHC 2265 (Fam), [2015] 2 FLR 1487; Re X 
(Children) (No 3) (n 16 above); Re Y (Children) (No 3) [2016] EWHC 503 (Fam), [2017] 1 FLR 1103; HB v A Local 
Authority (Local Government Association intervening) [2017] EWHC 524 (Fam), [2017] 1 WLR 4289 and A Local 
Authority v HB and Others (n 16 above). 
51 London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B (n 16 above); London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B (n 20 above); Re C, D, E 
(Children) (Radicalisation: Fact Finding) (n 16 above); Re C, D, E (Children) (Radicalisation: Welfare) [2016] EWHC 
3088 (Fam); Re K (Children) [2016] EWHC 1606 (Fam); Lancashire County Council v M and Others [2016] EWFC 9; Re C 
(A Child) (Care Proceedings: Disclosure) [2016] EWHC 3171 (Fam), [2017] 4 WLR 19; Re C (A Child) (Application for 
Public Interest Immunity) [2017] EWHC 692 (Fam), [2017] 2 FLR 1342; A Local Authority v M and Others [2017] EWHC 
2851 (Fam), [2018] 2 FLR 875; Re NAA (A Child: Findings on Death of Parents: Convenient Forum) [2017] EWFC B76, 
(unreported) 17 November 2017; A Local Authority v A Mother and Others [2017] EWHC 3741 (Fam), [2018] Fam Law 
793; and A Local Authority v A Mother and Others [2018] EWHC 1841 (Fam).  
Part II: Understanding the radicalisation cases 
1. Protecting vulnerable children from harm and promoting their welfare? De-
constructing the official explanation of the radicalisation cases 
In factually and legally situating the radicalisation cases and examining how family law 
and counter-terrorism have interacted through them, it is clear that their importance as 
a legal development goes beyond their novelty. The radicalisation cases are a factually 
and legally diverse set of cases that involve a number of family law proceedings. 
Through them, the concerns, concepts and lexicon of counter-terrorism have infiltrated 
deeply into family law. They are, therefore, more than the simple and temporary ‘foray 
by family law into the realms of counter-terrorism’52 that they were initially understood 
by some academics to be.  
The question that presents itself here is the following: why have the radicalisation cases 
emerged in the family courts at this particular point in time ? One way to answer this 
question would be to point out, as Hayden J does in London Borough of Tower Hamlets v 
M and Others, that the family courts of England and Wales ‘are in the vanguard of change 
in life and society. Where there are changes in medicine or in technology, or cultural 
change, so often they resonate first within the family’.53 The idea here seems to be that 
in the radicalisation cases the family courts are reacting to a changing terrorist 
landscape and a new kind of terrorist threat that, in the words of Hayden J in Re K, 
‘presents a distinctive danger to … children’.54 Since children (including British 
children),55 have been specifically targeted by ISIS for recruitment, have travelled to 
ISIS-held territory abroad and have participated in terrorist violence at a higher rate 
than before,56 it is not surprising that the family courts have understood their role in the 
radicalisation cases as one of protecting vulnerable children and promoting their 
welfare. 
This judicial explanation of the radicalisation cases, which is shared by the 
government,57 is legally accurate. It is of course the case that the state has a legal 
obligation, under both domestic and international law, to protect children up until the 
age of 18 from the kinds of harms that might result from joining terrorist organisations 
abroad and engaging in extremist and/or terrorist activities (even if they themselves 
choose to join such groups and engage in such activities) and to safeguard and promote 
their welfare interests.58 But this obvious legal position should not preclude a more 
critical interrogation of the radicalisation cases and the reasons behind their recent 
emergence in the family courts, particularly since protection, welfare and vulnerability 
are all politically charged concepts that have the potential to facilitate and lend 
                                                 
52 Walker (n 9 above), 128.  
53 See n 18 above, para [57].  
54 See n 51 above, para [24]. 
55 N Khomami, ‘Number of women and children who joined Isis “significantly underestimated”’ The Guardian (23 July 
2018).  
56 C Hamilton, F Colonnese and M Dunaiski, ‘Children and Counter-Terrorism’ (United Nations Interregional Crime and 
Justice Research Institute, 2016), 3. 
57 HM Government, ‘CONTEST: Annual Report for 2015’, Cm 9310 (2016), para 2.36. 
58 Sections 1 and 31 of CA 1989. Preventing children from travelling to Syria also engages the international humanitarian 
law and international human rights law duties of states. See: R Van Spaendonck, ‘To School or to Syria? The Foreign 
Fighter Phenomenon From a Children’s Rights Perspective’ (2016) 12 Utrecht Law Review 41, 42 
considerable legitimacy to ‘enhanced state-surveillance practices and interventions’.59  
Interrogating the language of protection and welfare 
‘Protectionist discourse’60 can be very ‘politically powerful’.61 Since 9/11, the 
apparently benevolent and benign ‘language of protection’ has been invoked by 
Western states to justify significant increases in their capacity for intervention and 
surveillance62 and to legitimate the securitisation of ‘traditionally non-security areas’.63 
Therefore, it is important to pay close attention to the justificatory and legitimating role 
that the language of protection plays in the radicalisation cases.  
The language of protection pervades the radicalisation cases. Particularly intriguing is 
its use by the judges as part of their attempt to explain to (the usually frustrated) 
parents why the state is intervening in their private lives. For example, in London 
Borough of Tower Hamlets v B, the second judgment in a case involving a 16-year-old 
girl who was apprehended at an airport intending to travel to ISIS-held territory in Syria 
after becoming ‘radicalised’ by exposing herself to copious amounts of ISIS propaganda, 
Hayden J emphasised that neither B nor her parents were ‘being “punished”’.64 Rather, 
Hayden J explained that the family court had sanctioned B’s initial removal from the 
care of her parents and granted the local authority’s application for care orders because 
‘the State is trying to protect their daughter from the damaging consequences of 
excessive ISIS propaganda’.65 In another radicalisation case, Re Y (Risk of Young Person 
Travelling to Join IS) (No 2), Hayden J tried to reassure the mother contesting the local 
authority’s application to renew a wardship order in relation to her son by reminding 
her that the family court has ‘an essentially protective jurisdiction’.66  
In a similar vein, the judges have asserted and reaffirmed the applicability and 
importance of the welfare or ‘paramountcy’67principle in the radicalisation cases. In 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets v M and Others, one of the earlier radicalisation cases, 
involving wardship applications with regards to a number of children who were feared 
to be at an imminent risk of travelling to Syria, Hayden J stressed that ‘it is the interests 
of the individual child that is paramount. This cannot be eclipsed by wider 
considerations of counter-terrorism policy or operations’.68 
There is a sense here that the language of protection and welfare is being used to justify 
and legitimate, rather than objectively explain, the radicalisation cases and their 
emergence in the family courts. By drawing a distinction between punishment and 
                                                 
59 V Coppock and M McGovern, ‘“Dangerous Minds”? Deconstructing Counter-Terrorism Discourse, Radicalisation and the 
“Psychological Vulnerability” of Muslim Children and Young People in Britain’ (2014) 28 Child Soc 242, 252.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, 242. 
62 IM Young, ‘The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State’ in M Friedman (ed), ‘Women 
and Citizenship’ (2003) 29 Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1, 1–3. 
63 A Richards, ‘The problem with “radicalization”: the remit of Prevent and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK’ 
(2011) 87 Int Aff 143, 151. 
64 See n 20 above, para [123]. 
65 Ibid.  
66 See n 39 above, para [18]. 
67 H Reece, ‘The Paramountcy Principle: Consensus or Construct’ (1996) 49 Curr Leg Probl 267. 
68 See n 18 above, para [18]. 
discipline on the one hand and child protection and welfare on the other, the judges 
seem to be keen to emphasise that they are ‘doing’ ordinary family law. The problem, 
however, is that such a dichotomy does not really exist in practice. For as Harry 
Hendrick has demonstrated, historically speaking ‘apparently protective’ laws and 
policies are never simply about the protection of children.69 Rather, they are usually 
‘part of’ much ‘larger’ political and social ‘agendas’70 and tend to reinforce more 
‘disciplinary’71 policies and practices. Moreover, as Helen Reece has argued, the 
‘apparent neutrality’72 of the paramountcy principle, coupled with its infamous 
‘indeterminacy’ and ‘elasticity’,73 allows for the pre-determined and prevailing policies 
and agendas of the state, even when they are unconnected to the actual welfare of 
children,74 to be ‘smuggled’75 in and to be judicially constructed as being in the best 
interests of the child.  
This is also true of the radicalisation cases. As noted above, radicalisation and 
extremism have been treated as safeguarding and child protection concerns. In doing so, 
the government has aligned the state’s duty to protect children and to promote their 
welfare with its interest in ‘preventing’ and countering terrorism. And so even if the 
judges in the radicalisation cases attempt to solely focus on the welfare interests of 
children, the concerns and priorities of counter-terrorism policy will inevitably 
determine, or at least ‘inform’,76 what is considered to be in the welfare interests of 
children.  
Examining the idea of vulnerability 
The language of protection and welfare stems from an understanding of those 
considered to be at risk of involvement in extremist and/or terrorist activities as 
vulnerable subjects. However, vulnerability is a ‘vague and nebulous concept’77 that, 
despite appearing ‘innocuous’,78 is in fact ‘loaded with political, moral and practical 
implications’.79 Therefore, the idea of vulnerability, which underpins the radicalisation 
cases and counter-terrorism policy and discourse more generally80 is problematic for a 
number of reasons.  
First, as Vicki Coppock and Mark McGovern argue, a ‘distinction’ must be drawn 
between the ‘inherent vulnerability’ of children, which results from their age and 
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‘biological immaturity,’ and the ‘structural vulnerability’ of children: a socially and 
politically constructed vulnerability influenced by and reinforcing of specific ‘social and 
political mechanisms’.81 This ‘structural’ notion of vulnerability seems to influence the 
radicalisation cases. For whilst it makes sense for the babies and young children in the 
radicalisation cases to be referred to as vulnerable individuals in need of protection, its 
use in relation to teenagers who are 16 years or older is somewhat odd and counter-
intuitive.82 One particularly strange example is A Local Authority v Y, the third and final 
judgment in a case involving three separate judgments dealing with the local authority’s 
wardship application in relation to Y, a teenage boy who was considered to be at risk of 
travelling to Syria after his two brothers travelled to, fought and eventually died in 
Syria.83 The local authority was concerned that Y would be unprotected after turning 18 
when wardship automatically falls away. Hayden J approved the local authority’s highly 
unusual application for a bespoke (voluntary) agreement to allow it to continue to 
intervene in Y’s life until Y turns 21 by stating that individuals do ‘not become less 
vulnerable merely by chronological age’.84  
Secondly, characterising individuals as vulnerable subjects is politically expedient for it 
renders them ‘as appropriate objects of state intervention and surveillance’.85 By 
divorcing vulnerability from age, the state has an almost unlimited capacity and an 
endless opportunity to intervene in and regulate the lives of perennially vulnerable 
individuals in the name of their protection. Such a conception of vulnerability is, 
therefore, ‘politically motivated’.86 
Finally, by characterising terrorists and potential terrorists as ‘brainwashed’87 victims, 
this notion of vulnerability does not take seriously the terrorist or potential terrorist, 
repugnant as his actions and beliefs are, as a political agent.88 This side-lining of 
political agency rests on and reinforces a problematic de-politicisation of both terrorism 
(and its causes) and children and childhood. The idea that individuals are ‘groom[ed]’89 
into committing acts of terrorism ignores the fact that terrorism is a form of politically 
motivated violence.90 Empirical evidence shows that young people who have joined ISIS 
and other terrorist organisations are not, for the most part, naïve individuals: they are, 
in fact, active agents, primarily motivated by political and social factors.91 But 
characterising them as vulnerable individuals ispolitically convenient,92 for it obscures 
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the role that political and social grievances, including the role that the foreign93 and 
social policies of Western states play in motivating young people to join terrorist 
organisations. For example, although Hayden J acknowledged in Re Y the fact that Y’s 
uncle was a ‘detainee in the Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre’94 had caused Y to ‘feel 
aggrieved’ by a ‘sense of injustice’,95 this is not cited as the main reason why Y is 
susceptible to radicalisation. Instead, Hayden J’s focus is on easier and less overtly 
political factors such as disaffection, confusion and unhappiness.96 
Moreover, this idea of vulnerability rests on a problematic construction of children and 
childhood ‘innocence’97 that ignores ‘children as political actors’98 and pathologises 
their political dissent as a ‘risk’ to be managed.99  
2. Ordinary child protection or politicised and securitised constructions of 
harm? 
The discussion above shows that the official narrative of the radicalisation cases and the 
reasons behind their emergence in the family courts has limited explanatory value. And 
so the question remains: what are the judges in the radicalisation cases exactly doing? 
Looking closely at the radicalisation cases themselves we find that the judges identify 
two main harms that they claim they are seeking to protect children from: travelling to 
join ISIS and other terrorist organisations in Syria and radicalisation and extremism.  
In the radicalisation cases where the main harm is that of travel to Syria, the question 
for the court is relatively straightforward: has a child and/or a parent travelled to Syria, 
have they attempted to travel to Syria or are they likely to attempt to travel to Syria? I 
say straightforward because if any of these questions are answered in the affirmative, 
the harms that could arise out of entry into a dangerous ‘war-zone,’ which include 
‘inhuman treatment or punishment’,100 ‘really serious bodily injury [and] even death’,101 
are ‘self-evident’.102 For whereas situations involving ‘emotional harm’ might be more 
contentious and difficult to deal with, the same cannot be said of situations such as 
travelling to ISIS-held territory in Syria, involving as they do a ‘palpable risk of physical 
harm’.103 Therefore, the travel of children to ISIS-held territory in Syria clearly engages 
the state’s ordinary child protection duties: since the children at risk of travelling face 
harms that are ‘at the extreme end’ of the child protection ‘spectrum’,104 the ‘[s]tate is 
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properly obligated to protect them’.105 
However, the fact that some of the harms identified in the radicalisation cases fall within 
the ordinary remit of the state’s child protection duties does not, of itself, explain the 
radicalisation cases and their emergence in the family courts at this particular point in 
time. First, whilst concern for the physical and bodily integrity of the children travelling 
to ISIS-held territory in Syria might explain the sudden upsurge in 2015 of the number 
of radicalisation cases appearing before the family courts, concerns about radicalisation 
appeared in the family courts as early as March 2013 in Re M (Children),106 more than a 
year before the rise of ISIS and its declaration of a Caliphate in June 2014. In fact, social 
services have been involved in assessing and investigating safeguarding and child 
protection concerns pertaining to extremism and radicalisation since at least 2012.107 
Secondly, it is important to remember that the involvement of children in terrorist-
related activities is nothing new to the UK. Children and teenagers were directly 
involved in the conflict in Northern Ireland during the Troubles.108 Children and 
teenagers were recruited into paramilitary and terrorist groups,109 participated in 
violent riots,110 were trained in the use of firearms111 and were charged with and 
convicted of violent terrorism offences.112 And yet, as I pointed out earlier, neither the 
child protection agencies nor the family courts were ever directly involved in 
countering Northern Irish terrorism.113  
This is because, as a number of scholars have argued, often what is considered to be 
harmful to children is never a self-evident or objective reality.114 Rather, behaviours and 
practices are constructed and ‘come to be seen as’ harmful to children115 through a 
process of ‘discovery’,116 social construction and labelling117 that is political,118 value-
laden and selective.119 So whilst actual conditions may or may not alter for children,120 a 
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changing political, social and cultural context can lead to the construction and 
‘discovery’121 of categories of harm, even if they have, in fact, always existed.122  
Drawing on this body of scholarship which emphasises the ‘politics of child 
protection’,123 in what follows I claim that the judges in the radicalisation cases are not 
simply responding to ordinary child protection concerns arising out of the latest 
manifestation of the terrorist threat. Rather, they are influenced by an increasing 
unease about and anxieties regarding the place of Islam and Muslims in the UK and the 
alleged threat posed by Muslim cultural difference and ideological or political Islam to 
British national identity and values. It is this political and social context that provided 
the ‘conditions of possibility’124 that made the emergence of the radicalisation cases in 
the family courts possible.  
Travel to Syria: Muslim cultural difference, the Muslim (family) problem and the 
bodies of Muslim children 
The concern for the physical and bodily integrity of children travelling to Syria in the 
radicalisation cases can be linked to underlying anxieties over the Muslim presence in 
the UK and its perceived threat to the British way of life. Over the last few decades, and 
particularly following the 7/7 terrorist attacks in July 2005, the UK has seen the 
emergence of a perceived ‘Muslim problem’,125 manifested in a growing sense of 
uneasiness about the apparent cultural dissent of the Muslim community from the 
liberal democratic consensus of mainstream British society.126 But whilst Britain’s 
Muslim problem has a number of ‘fronts’ that include terrorism and extremism, 
immigration and integration, unregulated mosques and Sharia councils, ‘hate-preachers’ 
and sexual ‘grooming’ gangs,127 the importance of the private sphere is particularly 
noticeable.128 Recent years have seen an increasing political and legal focus on domestic 
cultural practices associated with Muslim families,129 such as honour-killings, ‘sham’, 
forced, arranged and unregistered marriages, FGM and male circumcision.130 As a result, 
the Muslim family has become a highly politicised site of contestation, public scrutiny 
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and intervention.131 
Because Britain’s Muslim problem has been understood, to a significant extent, as a 
family problem, family law has been involved in both its construction and regulation. 
Particularly relevant for our purposes is family law’s increasing concern with and 
efforts to regulate the bodies and physical integrity of Muslim children132 from harmful 
domestic cultural practices such as forced marriage, FGM and, to a lesser extent, male 
circumcision. The last few years have witnessed the development of increasingly 
muscular and interventionist approaches to forced marriage133 and FGM134 and male 
circumcision135 with the aim of preventing these practices and punishing their 
perpetrators.  
That these recent developments in family law and policy provided the context for the 
emergence of the radicalisation cases dealing with travel concerns can be seen from the 
close connections made between the issue of children travelling to ISIS-held territory in 
Syria and forced marriage in both the radicalisation cases themselves and in official and 
popular discourse more generally. For example, in Re Z the mother applied for the 
return of Z’s passport (which had been confiscated by the police after Z had attempted 
to travel, on her own, to join ISIS in Syria) in order that Z attend her cousin’s wedding. 
The local authority’s application for wardship orders was approved based on what 
Hayden J saw as the double-risk that Z faced: ‘details suggest not only that she may be 
intending to travel to an ISIS country but also that she may herself be the subject of a 
planned, arranged or perhaps forced marriage’.136 Likewise in Re M Munby J held that 
although the use of the wardship jurisdiction has been declining, it was still an 
‘appropriate remedy’ in cases involving children being taken or at risk of being taken 
‘abroad for the purposes of forced marriage … Female genital mutilation or … where the 
fear is that a child has been taken abroad to travel to a dangerous war-zone’.137 In public 
discourse, the problem of children travelling to join terrorist groups in Syria was also 
closely connected to the problem of FGM and forced marriage. For example, in his 
speech on extremism in 2015, David Cameron spoke of the need to tackle the ‘Islamist 
ideology’ that impels children ‘to run off to Syria’ and that has allowed communities to 
continue to practice the ‘brutality of Female Genital Mutilation’ and ‘the horrors of 
forced marriage’ against their children.138  
The point here is that travel to Syria was not just understood as a danger to the life and 
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physical integrity of children. The physical danger to children was itself understood and 
represented as another manifestation of Britain’s Muslim problem. Those travelling to 
join ISIS in Syria have been depicted as unintegrated individuals who have become 
alienated from mainstream British life because of their rejection of British values,139 
suggesting that the state’s concern with and response to the children and families 
travelling to join ISIS in Syria was part of a much wider ‘moral panic’140 about Muslim 
cultural difference in the UK.  
It is perhaps this difference in the political and social context that partly explains the 
discrepancy between the state’s reaction to the involvement of children in terrorist 
violence in Northern Ireland and the situation in the radicalisation cases. Whilst it is 
certainly the case that some of the official and popular British discourses on the 
Troubles were culturalist in nature,141 and drew on a long history of a racialised142 
construction of Irish Catholics as ‘significant Other[s]’143 the nature and extent of the 
cultural othering of Irish Catholics during the Troubles differed significantly to the 
cultural othering of Muslims in post 9/11 counter-terrorist discourse.144 For whereas 
the Troubles were predominantly understood as a political conflict involving political 
acts of violence,145 Islamist terrorism, as I shall argue below, has been interpreted 
through a culturalist lens and understood as another signifier of Muslim cultural 
difference.146 Moreover, despite its history of exclusion in Britain, Catholicism ‘still 
placed Irish people within the Christian traditions of Europe’.147 The same cannot be 
said of Islam which has never really been seen as belonging to Europe148 and which, 
since 9/11, has been constructed as ‘existential’ threats to Western culture and 
civilisation.149 
Since culture is often perceived as being located, produced and reproduced in the 
private realm of the home and family,150 the problematic and ‘pathological’151 Muslim 
family has come to symbolise the cultural otherness of Britain’s Muslim communities. 
Therefore, the Muslim family (especially its child-rearing practices) has been 
problematised, intervened in and regulated in ways that the Northern Irish family never 
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really was, creating the normative and conceptual space that made the emergence of the 
radicalisation cases possible.  
Radicalisation and extremism 
Whilst this differing social and political landscape and the development of the Muslim 
(family) problem might explain the emergence of radicalisation cases dealing with 
travel to ISIS-held territory in Syria, it is important to remember that the cases are not 
confined to the issue of travel alone. For as I claimed earlier, the judges in the 
radicalisation cases identify two harms from which children must be protected: travel 
to Syria and radicalisation and extremism.  
But whereas the issue of children travelling to join ISIS-held territory in Syria does at 
least raise some obvious child protection concerns, for two reasons the same cannot be 
said where the harm in question is that of radicalisation and extremism.  
First, radicalisation and extremism are terms that come from the counter-terrorism and 
national security context and are, therefore, entirely alien to the usual workings of 
family law. Here it is worth noting that the judges in the radicalisation cases do not 
provide their own definitions of radicalisation and extremism. Instead, they apply the 
definitions provided by the government in the Prevent strategy, which defines 
radicalisation as ‘the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms 
of extremism leading to terrorism’152 and extremism as the ‘vocal or active opposition 
to fundamental British values including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty 
and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’.153 By directly applying 
Prevent’s definition of radicalisation and extremism, the judges establish a clear 
synergy and continuity between what they are doing in the radicalisation cases and the 
logic and aims of counter-terrorism policy.  
Secondly, radicalisation and extremism are relatively recent concepts which only 
entered academic and policy circles after 9/11.154 They certainly did not exist in the 
counter-terrorism policy and discourse during the years of the Troubles.155 They are, 
therefore, important in terms of explaining the discrepancy between the Northern Irish 
context and the situation in the radicalisation cases. The point here is that the 
radicalisation cases are not just responding to a specific new manifestation of terrorism 
that happens to raise patent child protection concerns. By identifying radicalisation and 
extremism as a second harm from which children must be protected, the radicalisation 
cases are influenced by, reflect and reinforce recent changes and shifts in the nature, 
purpose and remit of UK counter-terrorism policy, practice and discourse. Analysing the 
ways in which the radicalisation cases approach the concepts of radicalisation and 
extremism is, therefore, key to understanding the radicalisation cases, their emergence 
in the family courts and the interaction between family law and counter-terrorism that 
they have engendered.  
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i) Constructing radicalisation and extremism as free-standing harms: 
departing from the usual principles of family law 
Radicalisation and extremism emerge as important concepts in the radicalisation cases. 
For even when the main question in a radicalisation case appears to be whether or not a 
child or a parent has attempted or is likely to attempt to leave the jurisdiction in order 
to join ISIS abroad, the judges are in fact, for the most part, preoccupied with searching 
for the existence of radicalisation and extremism. In fact, local authorities unable to 
provide cogent evidence of radicalisation and extremism often find that they struggle to 
convince the judge that a child and/or a parent has attempted or is likely to travel to 
join terrorist groups in Syria. For example, in Re Y (Children) (No 3) the parents were 
accused of attempting to travel with their children to join ISIS in Syria. But the ‘absence 
of any evidence’156 proving that the parents in both cases had a ‘radical Islamist’157 or 
extremist ‘mind-set’158 that could ‘explain a desire to relocate to Syria’,159 meant that 
Munby J was unable to find that the parents were attempting to travel to Syria.160 By 
contrast, in Leicester City Council v T161 Hayden J granted the local authority’s 
application to remove the children from the care of the mother because he was able to 
find, based on the available evidence, that the ‘mother’s intention to cross into Syria was 
driven by’162 an extremist ‘religious ideology’.163  
However, radicalisation and extremism are not only relevant insofar as they can help 
the family courts to determine whether or not a child or a parent has attempted to 
travel or is likely to travel to ISIS-held territory in Syria. Radicalisation and extremism 
have, in fact, been treated in an increasing number of radicalisation cases as free-
standing harms.164 Since ‘the risk,’ in an increasing number of radicalisation cases, is no 
longer ‘one of flight’165 to ISIS-held territory in Syria, the focus of the family courts has 
gone ‘beyond the question of threatened or actual removal from the jurisdiction’.166 
Instead, the family courts have been increasingly pre-occupied with investigating ‘what 
materials the children have been exposed to at home’ and whether the parent in 
question ‘supports the cause of the so-called Islamic State’,167 not to determine the 
likelihood of to travel to Syria but to assess ‘the welfare impact of the alleged beliefs and 
sympathies’168 on the children. Therefore, in radicalisation cases where ‘there is no 
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likely flight risk’ to ISIS-held territory to Syria,169 the focus of the family court is, in the 
words of Newton J in A Local Authority v M and Others, on the following: ‘whether and in 
what circumstances the religiously motivated views of parents are so harmful to their 
children that the State should intervene to protect the child’.170  
Consequently, the radicalisation of children as a result of their exposure to extremist 
political or religious ideologies and beliefs has been identified as a distinct ‘new facet of 
child protection’171 and an independent ‘new type of harm to children that may justify 
state intervention in family life’.172 Importantly, the harm to children that is being 
alleged and contemplated in these cases is from the ‘radicalised’ or ‘extremist’ beliefs 
themselves rather than the ‘flight risk’ that they might lead to.173 Religious and political 
beliefs that are deemed to be extremist and that can radicalise children are treated in 
these radicalisation cases as being in and of themselves harmful and dangerous to 
children.  
During the interviews, the solicitors and barristers expressed both surprise and unease 
at how readily the family judges in the radicalisation cases have accepted allegations of 
harm based on the radicalisation and extremism and their willingness to assess and 
even make findings regarding the religious and political beliefs of parents. This is 
because in assessing whether the religious and political views of parents are extremist 
in nature and in finding them to be in and of themselves harmful to children, the 
radicalisation cases have significantly departed from established family law principles.  
Although there is a long-established body of family case law where the family courts 
have limited the traditionally wide discretion given to parents to bring up their children 
according to their own religious beliefs and doctrines,174 the way in which the 
radicalisation cases have approached concerns regarding radicalisation and extremism 
go beyond the usual restrictions on the responsibility of parents in the religious 
upbringing and education of their children.175 For whereas the family courts have in the 
past restricted the ability of parents to include their children in religious practices and 
have been concerned with the ‘secular effects’ of certain religious beliefs and practices 
on the physical and emotional well-being of the children in question,176 it is rare for the 
family courts to find that the religious beliefs of parents are in and of themselves harmful 
to children.177 It is even rarer, and in fact unprecedented, for the family courts to find 
the political views of parents to be harmful to children. For example, in Re P (Contact: 
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Supervision),178 a case from 1996 involving a mother who applied to have the children’s 
contact with their father terminated, accusing the father of being a Nazi sympathiser, 
holding extreme political views and racist and anti-Semitic attitudes and of taking 
photographs with his son dressed in Nazi regalia, Wall J dismissed the relevance of 
these allegations and went as far as stating that a father with these political views 
cannot be denied access to his children.179  
Moreover, in the past the family courts have tended to regulate the parental 
responsibility of parents towards the religious upbringing of their children in cases 
involving private law proceedings. For although family courts can and do intervene to 
prevent and protect children from quasi-religious or religiously inspired practices 
which harm children or deny them necessary medical attention,180 the family courts 
have historically shown a marked reluctance to compulsorily intervene in families 
under public law proceedings as a result of concerns about the religious beliefs and 
practices of parents.181 The reason for this was most clearly articulated in the dissenting 
opinion of Baroness Hale in Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings)182 when she stated that: 
‘the State does not and cannot take away the children of all the people who commit 
crimes, who abuse alcohol or drugs, who suffer from physical or mental illnesses or 
disabilities, or who espouse anti-social political or religious beliefs’.183 The 
radicalisation cases change this. For in radicalisation cases involving public law 
proceedings, the judges have not only been willing to assess the religious beliefs of 
parents but have also been willing to find these beliefs to be in and of themselves 
harmful to children such that they warrant coercive state intervention.  
ii) Beyond terrorist violence: the harm of radicalisation and extremism 
and the influence of a changing counter-terrorist landscape 
Radicalisation and extremism are concepts which represent important shifts in the UK’s 
counter-terrorist landscape. For it is important to remember that radicalisation and 
extremism only began to be used in academic and policy circles in Europe after 9/11, in 
an attempt to understand the ‘root causes’ of ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism.184 To 
that end, radicalisation was conceptualised as a psychological process185 that leads 
(usually young186) individuals to support and eventually commit acts of terrorism. 
Importantly, the radicalisation process was understood as a ‘theological’187 process that 
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is primarily fuelled by extremism: fundamentalist interpretations of and ideological 
approaches to Islam which reject and seek to undermine Western liberal democracy.188 
Islamist terrorism was, therefore, distinguished from the ‘old’ terrorism of nationalist, 
leftist and anarchist organisations (such as the IRA) and treated as a ‘new’189 kind of 
terrorism. The ‘new’ terrorist threat was constructed in both culturalist and ideological 
terms: Islamist terrorist attacks were not just understood as acts of political violence 
directed at the institutions of the state,190 but as symptoms of a much wider ‘clash of 
civilisations’191 and an ideological attack on Western civilisation, cultural values and 
way of life. 
Despite the dearth of empirical evidence to substantiate the links between terrorism, 
radicalisation and extremism,192 the concepts took a strong hold in the UK,193 most 
notably in the Prevent strategy which seeks to ‘prevent’ terrorism by tackling the 
radicalisation process and countering extremist Islamist ideologies.194 The 
preoccupation with tackling the ideological causes of Islamist terrorism195 escalated 
during the term of the Coalition government, which claimed that the effective 
countering of terrorism required tackling not just ‘violent extremism’196 but also ‘non-
violent’197 extremist ideas which, by actively opposing liberal democratic or 
‘fundamental British values’, create an ‘atmosphere conducive to terrorism’.198 
Therefore, a direct link was established between subscribing to extremist Islamist 
ideologies (even when they are non-violent) and propensity towards terrorist 
violence.199 Importantly, however, extremism was seen as being harmful not just 
because of its role in causing and justifying terrorism. Extremist Islamist ideologies and 
particularly conservative or fundamentalist forms of Islamic devoutness200 were 
increasingly identified by the government as being in and of themselves harmful.201 
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Therefore, illiberal and undemocratic Islamist ideologies and fundamentalist 
interpretations of Islam were represented as being harmful because they pose an 
unacceptable ideological challenge to ‘fundamental British values’.202  
With the entry into and dominance of the concepts of radicalisation and extremism in 
UK counter-terrorism policy and discourse, counter-terrorism has been redefined. As a 
result of the shift from the language of counter-terrorism and violence to the language of 
counter-extremism, ideas and values,203 the remit and reach of counter-terrorism has 
significantly expanded.204 The government’s focus was no longer on just countering 
terrorism by responding to criminal acts of terrorist violence but on intervening as early 
as possible in the ‘pre-criminal’205 space of extremist ideologies and beliefs.  
The ways in which the judges in the radicalisation cases articulate, or struggle to 
articulate, the harm of radicalisation and extremism reflects the influence of these 
recent changes in the UK’s counter-terrorist landscape on the family courts. As Rachel 
Taylor has recently argued, there are two main approaches to the harm of radicalisation 
and extremism in the radicalisation cases.206 The first approach emphasises the role 
that radicalisation and extremism play in leading to terrorist violence.207 The idea that 
harmful radicalisation involves an active support for and belief in the causes and 
ideologies promoted by terrorist organisations was made clear in Re M (Children),208 
one of the earlier radicalisation cases to appear before the family courts, which involved 
private law proceedings initiated by the mother who accused the father of being an 
‘Islamic fundamentalist’ who had attempted to radicalise his children.209 Whilst 
acknowledging that radicalisation is a ‘vague and non-specific word’, Holman J was 
careful to stress that it cannot simply mean ‘that a set of Muslim beliefs and practices is 
being strongly instilled in these children’.210 Rather, radicalisation was limited to its role 
in ‘negatively influencing (a child) with radical fundamental thought which is associated 
with terrorism’211 and ‘indoctrinating’ them with ideologies ‘involving the possibility of 
“terrorism”’.212 This focus on terrorism and terrorist violence was made even more 
explicit in Re K (Children),213 a case involving an application by the local authority to 
withdraw care proceedings in relation to three children whose parents the local 
authority feared had espoused extremist views, on the basis that there was insufficient 
evidence that the children had suffered or were likely to suffer significant harm. In that 
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case, Hayden J stressed that the harm that the family courts are seeking to prevent in 
the radicalisation cases is ‘the process by which a person comes to support terrorism as 
opposed to merely extreme religious beliefs’.214  
Whilst the first approach to radicalisation sees violent radicalisation and extremism as 
harmful because they ‘may play a causative role in turning children to acts of violent 
extremism and terrorism’,215 Taylor identifies a second approach where ‘non-violent 
radicalisation might be seen as harmful in itself, regardless of whether it is likely to 
cause future violent acts’.216 Here Taylor points to A Local Authority v M and Others, a 
case involving a mother who had been detained by Turkish authorities at the border 
with Syria and accused by the local authority of radicalising her children and attempting 
to take them to ISIS-held territory in Syria. By finding that the mother had ‘exposed her 
children to a risk of emotional and psychological harm’217 by ‘exposing her children to 
radical views [regarding] free-mixing, alcohol, homosexuality, democracy, Judaism and 
more wrongly how and in what way Sharia and the Caliphate should be established 
across the world’,218 Taylor contends that the implication here is that some religious 
views ‘are so distasteful and antithetical to majority values that to be exposed to them is 
emotionally and psychologically harmful to children’.219  
We see, therefore, that the family courts in the radicalisation cases are both influenced 
by and have reinforced the recent changes in counter-terrorism policy and discourse 
that I outlined earlier. Radicalisation as a result of exposure to extremist ideologies, 
beliefs and values is regarded as being harmful to children because of the supposed link 
between radicalisation and extremism and terrorist violence and because such 
ideologies and beliefs are illiberal and intolerant.  
In this second part of the article, I have attempted to gain a better understanding of the 
radicalisation cases and the reasons behind their emergence in the family courts by de-
constructing the official narrative which understands the radicalisation cases as an 
attempt by the state to protect vulnerable children from suffering harm and promoting 
their welfare. In focusing on, examining and unpicking the way in which the judges have 
articulated the harms that they believe the children should be protected from, I have 
demonstrated the influence of the wider political and security landscape on the 
emergence of the radicalisation cases in the family courts and, indeed, the contribution 
of the family courts to this landscape. The judges in the radicalisation cases do not 
simply respond to ordinary child protection issues and concerns raised by the latest 
manifestation of the terrorist threat. Rather, the radicalisation cases are influenced by 
and situated within a wider sense of panic regarding and collective anxiety over the 
supposed cultural, ideological and security threat posed by regressive, illiberal and 
politicised interpretations of Islam and approaches to Muslim culture and identity.  
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Part III: Counter-terrorism and family law: a dangerous interaction 
The radicalisation cases and the unprecedented interaction between family law and 
counter-terrorism that they have engendered have caused academic commentators, 
from both the fields of family law and counter-terrorism, some concern. From the family 
law perspective, Taylor has argued that importing radicalisation and extremism, which 
are highly contested and politicised concepts which lack legal precision,220 from 
counter-terrorism policy into the child protection regime and family law more generally 
is both problematic and dangerous.221 In applying these concepts and suggesting that 
non-violent extremism and radicalisation can potentially harm children, Taylor 
maintains that the family courts risk prioritising counter-terrorism concerns and aims 
over the welfare of individual children,222 undermining their neutrality when it comes 
to parental responsibility for religious upbringing of children223 and encroaching on 
human rights and protected religious freedoms.224 From the counter-terrorism 
perspective, Clive Walker and Jessie Blackbourn have pointed to the highly stringent 
conditions that have been imposed on some of the children and parents in the 
radicalisation cases to argue that the involvement of the family courts in counter-
terrorism can lead to ‘very Draconian’ outcomes that surpass, in their severity, some of 
the most extreme counter-terrorism measures, including Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures (TPIMs).225  
Yet despite these warnings and misgivings, academic commentators have, generally 
speaking, been rather confident and even optimistic about the role of the family courts 
in the radicalisation cases. For example, Taylor suggests that the family courts 
appropriately differentiate and distinguish between violent and non-violent 
radicalisation and extremism in the radicalisation cases. Taylor argues that whilst some 
radicalisation cases treat non-violent radicalisation and extremism as being potentially 
harmful to children, to date ‘there is no reported case in which non-violent 
radicalisation … has been the sole ground for findings of significant harm’.226 To that 
end, Taylor points to the fact that in the cases where actual findings of harm have been 
made with regards to accusations of parental radicalisation and extremism, ‘the 
evidence went beyond non-violent ideology into active support for terrorism and 
extreme depictions of violence’.227 For example, in A Local Authority v M and Others, the 
mother did not only expose her children to illiberal and intolerant views but had in fact 
‘actively involved the children in advocating violence’.228 The mother had attempted to 
travel with her children to ISIS-held territory in Syria, was involved with a group of 
women who ‘actively promote the political beliefs of ISIS’,229 took her children to 
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political rallies ‘in the presence of many known political extremists’230 and radicalised 
her children to the extent that they themselves expressed ‘chilling’ views supportive of 
ISIS atrocities.231 Similarly, in London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B, Hayden J found 
that B had suffered ‘serious emotional harm’232 as a result of her exposure to the 
‘shocking’233 and ‘very significant amount of radicalising material’234 which included 
‘very violent videos and images produced by ISIS’.235 Moreover, B had not only ‘believed 
in the cause that the Islamic State was fighting for’236 but was, in fact, ‘frank about her 
intentions to travel to the Islamic State’.237  
Therefore, according to Taylor, whereas violent radicalisation is clearly and definitively 
identified as a new category of harm that can justify state intervention, the question of 
whether non-violent radicalisation can constitute a free-standing category of harm has 
been left open by the family courts238 and, given the current state of the case-law, seems 
rather unlikely. Taylor welcomes this distinction in the case law’s treatment of violent 
and non-violent radicalisation. Since children radicalised into violent extremist 
ideologies ‘undoubtedly’ suffer ‘extensive emotional harm’,239 Taylor maintains that 
diverting children from actively supporting terrorist organisations and becoming 
involved in terrorism achieves clear child protection and safeguarding interests.240 The 
suggestion here is that by distinguishing between violent and non-violent radicalisation 
and extremism and only treating the former as an independent category of harm that 
can warrant coercive intervention, the family courts have resisted being unduly 
influenced by the government’s counter-terrorism concerns and priorities and have 
protected important family law principles by ensuring that the child, his or her 
protection from significant harm and his or her welfare remains the ultimate focus.  
In a similar vein, Susan Edwards has lauded the family judges in the radicalisation cases 
for ‘guarding against Orientalised misconceptions of Islamic devoutness’, arguing that 
they have generally ‘resisted’ and even ‘challenged’ the ‘popular stereotyping of devout 
Muslim families as being prone to “radicalisation”’.241 Pointing to Re A and B, where 
Russell J rejected the mother’s allegation that the father was a radicalised individual for 
its lack of cogent evidence and firmly stressed that ‘there must be no suggestion that the 
courts would accept or tolerate any suggestion that adherents of the Islamic faith … are 
ipso facto, supporters of extremism’,242 Edwards claims that the family courts have 
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‘reject[ed] mere suspicion based on religious stereotyping’.243  
Whilst I agree, and have argued elsewhere, that the approach of the family courts to 
radicalisation and extremism allegations has been ‘rightly … cautious’,244 I think that the 
radicalisation cases and the interaction between family law and counter-terrorism 
should be approached with more trepidation and concern. There are a number of 
reasons for this.  
First, whilst it might seem that the judges in the radicalisation cases distinguish 
between holding extreme and illiberal religious views and following conservative forms 
of Islamic observance and harmful radicalisation and extremism, this distinction is often 
difficult to maintain in practice. This can be seen from the way in which strict or 
literalist Islamic observance is problematised in some of the radicalisation cases. For 
example, in exploring the reasons behind B’s radicalisation in London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets v B, Hayden J is clearly uncomfortable with the mother’s ‘zealous Islamic 
beliefs’.245 So although Hayden J insists that he is not suggesting ‘that the mother held 
radicalised beliefs’,246 the degree of the mother’s Islamic observance is, nonetheless, 
problematised and directly linked to B’s radicalisation: ‘I have found on the spectrum of 
Islamic observance she is at the most committed end. In this family those beliefs proved 
to be fertile ground for B’s journey to radicalisation’.247 By the same token, a lack of 
‘strict Islamic observance’,248 including the fact that the father ‘broke the Ramadan fast’ 
in Re A and B249 and the mother in Re NAA ‘did not wear a hijab … or pray during the 
day’250 are treated as evidence that they are not extremist individuals. Similarly, 
although Russell J was clear in Lancashire County Council v M and Others that the father’s 
‘extreme views’251 ‘on their own’ would ‘not have made it necessary to remove the 
children’,252 the fact that the father who ‘doesn’t tolerate different views, races or 
religions’,253 is ‘against democracy’254 and ‘hates gay people’255 is used to explain why 
the father ‘is no ordinary believer’ but ‘a bigot’256 who poses a danger to his children.  
Therefore, whilst non-violent but extreme and illiberal religious views and very 
conservative forms of Islamic observance are not treated as constituting a separate 
category of harm, the judges in the radicalisation cases are clearly uncomfortable with 
and apprehensive about the fact that, in the words of Munby P in Re X (Children) (No 3), 
‘not every parent is as steeped in the values and belief-systems of post-Enlightenment 
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Europe as we might like to imagine’.257 The Orientalist undertone to this statement 
shows that the radicalisation cases are influenced by a narrative of Western cultural 
superiority that sees the parental rejection of ‘post-Enlightenment’ European values as 
being undesirable and even potentially harmful to children.258  
Secondly, Taylor’s suggestion that children exposed to violent, as opposed to non-
violent, radicalisation and extremist ideologies that advocate and lead to terrorism 
suffer clear and obvious emotional harm that justifies the intervention of the family 
courts259 requires careful consideration. Harm is a vague, ‘conceptually foggy’260 and 
indeterminate concept.261 This is particularly true in the radicalisation cases where the 
harm in question is identified as being ‘emotional’ or ‘psychological’ in nature,262 
because such categories of harm are ‘nebulous’, ‘contested’ and especially ‘difficult to 
establish’.263 So we find that in A Local Authority v M and Others, exactly how the 
children suffered emotional and psychological harm as a result of their exposure to and 
adoption of their mother’s extremist views is left unarticulated. And although Hayden J 
explains in London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B that B’s exposure to violent ISIS 
propaganda had emotionally harmed her by leaving her ‘de-humanised’264 and ‘inured 
to human suffering’,265 the problem is that these – somewhat ambiguous and elusive – 
conclusions are drawn without a specific expert psychological assessment of B and the 
emotional and psychological impact that the propaganda had on her.266  
Thirdly, as I argued above, even though a phenomenon may be harmful in an objective 
sense, harm is ‘discovered’ or ‘pointed out’ through a process of social and political 
construction that is highly selective in nature.267 Therefore, we find that right-wing 
radicalisation and extremism, albeit categories of radicalisation and extremism on the 
rise268 and of concern (at least officially) to the government269 do not feature in the 
radicalisation cases. In fact in Re A,270 a case which included allegations by the local 
authority that a father had been an active member of the far-right group the English 
Defence League (EDL), was involved in violent protests and had espoused racist 
views,271 Munby P held that membership of and involvement with the EDL was ‘neither 
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here nor there’.272 Munby P went as far as to state that ‘[m]embership of an extremist 
group such as the EDL was not, without more, any basis for care proceedings’.273 There 
are, of course, differences between Islamist and far-right radicalisation, extremism and 
terrorism, not least the level and intensity of the threat posed by jihadist terror groups 
such ISIS. But for an allegation as serious as that of active and violent involvement in a 
far-right organisation as notorious as the EDL, in a climate of rising far-right extremism 
and terrorism, to be so quickly and strongly dismissed as entirely irrelevant without 
further probing suggests a double-standard in the application of the harm principle and 
risks re-creating the Muslim community as an inherently ‘suspect community’.274  
Fourthly, although preventing children from becoming terrorists and/or supporters of 
terrorism might seem like an obvious and legitimate concern for the family courts to be 
involved with, the implications so far have been serious and concerning. For by bringing 
family law into the fold of counter-terrorism, the radicalisation cases both continue and 
extend dominant practices in UK counter-terrorism. The history of counter-terrorism in 
the UK is one of deeper incursions into275 and increasing control of social life and civil 
society276 in the name of security and its prioritisation over all other considerations.277 
But whereas, historically, counter-terrorism has prioritised security over liberty,278 with 
the radicalisation cases we see a prioritisation of security over privacy. This can be seen 
from the at times rather Draconian outcomes of the radicalisation cases which include: 
the interim279 and (more rarely) permanent280 removal of children from their homes; 
granting the local authority shared parental responsibility and potentially unlimited 
access to the children and families through permanent care orders;281 granting the local 
authority significant access to the child and family through supervision orders;282 
transferring parental responsibility to the High Court through wardship orders;283 and 
the electronic tagging of parents.284 What makes these outcomes even more Draconian 
is that an appropriately thorough consideration of their impact on the right to respect 
for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection 
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of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 is almost non-existent.285 
Moreover, by establishing the family and the home as new frontiers in the state’s battle 
against terrorism, the radicalisation cases have resulted in the unprecedented 
securitisation of the family, constructing the home and the family as potential security 
threats. In bringing counter-terrorism within the fold of family law, the radicalisation 
cases securitise the family in two main ways. First, by presenting radicalisation as a 
‘process’ which ‘goes on within families’,286 the radicalisation cases construct 
extremism, radicalisation and terrorism, which are essentially political problems, as 
family problems for which pathological or failed families are responsible. Because of its 
inscrutable and essentially private nature, the family is presented as a potentially 
dangerous site where extremism ‘goes unchallenged’287 and can be ‘nurtured’,288 
particularly when children are also home-educated, since home-schooling can 
contribute to the ‘isolation and radicalisation’ of children and can be used by parents as 
a way of ‘circumventing’ the ‘scrutiny’ of ‘the system’.289 Secondly, this familialisation of 
the terrorist threat is reinforced through the portrayal of radicalisation and extremism 
as either being, in and of themselves, parenting failures or the result of poor and 
deficient parenting. Parents who hold extreme religious beliefs are seen, ‘by virtue of 
that fact alone’,290 as a risk to their children. Holding extremist or radical beliefs is, 
consequently, treated as a parental ‘deviancy’.291 The radicalisation of children is also 
blamed on parental failure and is presented as being ‘above all else a significant 
parenting deficiency’.292 In a way, the emphasis on parenting is an example of the 
increasing ‘politicisation’ of parenting in recent years293 and the tendency to blame 
‘social ills,’ such as anti-social behaviour, crime and youth violence on ‘poor 
parenting’.294 But by adding radicalisation, extremism and terrorism to the list of ‘social 
ills’ for which parents can be blamed, the radicalisation cases take the politicisation 
parenting one step further and securitise parenting.  
Finally, this interaction between counter-terrorism and family law has also securitised 
family law. This can be shown from the use of electronic tagging and closed material 
procedures295 in some of the radicalisation cases. Whereas electronic tagging and closed 
material procedures are very rarely used in the family justice system,296 they are, 
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however, familiar to counter-terrorism law. The fact that these highly controversial 
practices, which have raised significant human rights concerns,297 have been used in the 
radicalisation cases suggests that family law is at risk of being turning into a parallel 
counter-terrorism justice system where civil liberties and human rights protections can 
be eroded in the name of national security. 
Conclusion 
In this article I have argued that the radicalisation cases and the interaction between 
family law and counter-terrorism that they have engendered represent an important 
and novel legal moment that warrants careful analysis and critical examination. In 
Part I, I considered how this interaction has taken place by factually outlining the 
radicalisation places and situating them in the family justice system. In pointing out the 
factual and legal diversity of the radicalisation cases and the varied ways in which they 
have engaged the family justice system, I demonstrated that the radicalisation cases 
have led to a more far-reaching and enduring interaction between family law and 
counter-terrorism than was generally appreciated in the early academic literature.  
In Part II, I looked more critically at why the radicalisation cases have emerged in the 
family courts at this point in time in particular and the reasons behind the 
unprecedented interaction between family law and counter-terrorism. To that end, I 
took issue with the apparently simple and apolitical official narrative that understands 
the radicalisation cases as an attempt by the state to protect vulnerable children from 
harm and promote their welfare. I argued the harms that the judges in the radicalisation 
cases seek to protect children from are both influenced by and in fact actively reinforce 
and further a changing social, political and legal context and a shifting counter-terrorist 
landscape that is increasingly concerned with and seeks to regulate Muslim cultural 
difference, Muslim family life and the security, ideological and civilizational threat 
posed by Islam and Islamism. In doing so, I showed why the radicalisation cases cannot 
be understood as a simple response or reaction by the family courts to a new terrorist 
threat that happens to raise patent child protection concerns and to engage the family 
justice system.  
In Part III I examined some of the implications of this interaction between family law 
and counter-terrorism. Although I broadly agreed with the claim made by some 
academics that the family courts have, in general, been appropriately cautious and 
restrained in the radicalisation cases and have attempted to immune themselves from 
counter-terrorism and popular discourses on Islam and Muslims, I argued that we 
should be more guarded and apprehensive about the involvement of the family courts 
and family law in the counter-terrorist project.  
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